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Federal Mediation Privilege: Should
Mediation Communications
Be Protected From Subsequent Civil
& Criminal Proceedings?
In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Dated December 17, 1996'

I. INTRODUCTION
The mediation process depends upon the promise that all oral and written
communication generated during mediation remains confidential. Confidentiality
protects the process from accusations of partiality and promotes the exchange of
information between the parties by ensuring that the communication will not be
entered in court if the mediation fails. However, the term confidentiality alone does
not cast an iron-clad protection over mediation communications. For instance, nonparties to a mediation are not precluded from obtaining information because they
were not a party agreeing to keep the communications in confidence. In addition,
mediators and mediation programs are susceptible to subpoenas compelling them to
hand over mediation records.
Some state legislatures have responded to these problems by enacting statutes
that grant a mediation privilege. The federal government has not responded with the
same vigor. The federal courts have been reluctant to create a new common-law
privilege to cover mediation. Instead, many of the courts believe that the legislature
is the appropriate forum to create the privilege and will wait for Congress to
expressly interject and manifest an intention to create a federal mediation privilege.
This Note examines the decision of the Fifth Circuit to deny the existence of a
federal mediation privilege when parties moved to quash a grand jury subpoena that
sought mediation records to investigate criminal wrongdoing allegedly committed
in the mediation program. This Note will focus on the federal government's refusal
to establish a mediation privilege despite the fact that some states have embraced
such a privilege.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In November of 1996, a dispute arose between an individual involved in a
mediation proceeding and the Federal Government when the Government served a
grand jury subpoena on the custodian of records of the Texas Agricultural Mediation
Program ("TAM").2 TAM was suspected of criminal wrongdoing when the Office
of Investigator General ("OIG") of the United States Department of Agriculture

1. 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998).
2. Id. at 489-90. TAM, a state agricultural loan mediation program at Texas Tech University, is
administered by the state of Texas. Id.
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("USDA") discovered irregularities during an audit in 1995.? The subpoena sought
documents generated from a mediation proceeding that involved Gervase and Ira
Moczygembas and the Poth Land and Cattle Company (hereinafter referred to
collectively as the "Moczygembas"). 4 On December 16, 1996, the Moczygembas,
as a third party, moved to intervene and quash the subpoena on the grounds that a
mediation privilege protected their proceeding from disclosure.5 TAM receives
funding under the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, which was passed due to
escalating farm debt that accrued in the United States in the mid-1980s. s The
Agricultural Credit Act grants funding to the states to operate an agricultural loan
mediation program to resolve disputes between farmers and their lenders.7 In order
for a state program to be approved for this funding, the state must mandate that all
mediation sessions remain confidential! The state of Texas proposed that TAM
would follow the "confidential" guidelines of the Texas Alternative Dispute
Resolution Procedures Act ("Texas ADR statute") as set forth in the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code Section 154.001. 9 This statute requires that
"communication [made by a party] ... in an alternative dispute resolution procedure
... is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not to be used as evidence
against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding."'
The Texas
ADR statute further provides that if the above provision conflicts with other legal
requirements, then a court must decide in camera whether the ADR proceedings
warrant a protective order of the court, or instead are subject to disclosure."
The District Court referred the case to a magistrate judge who denied the
Moczygembas' motion to quash the grand jury subpoena on the grounds that federal
law does not recognize a mediation privilege. 2 The Moczygembas appealed the
decision, and the District Court vacated the magistrate's order and held that the
subpoenaed documents were protected by a federal mediation privilege. 3 The
District Court relied on three separate statutes in deciding that the mediation
communications were protected from disclosure to the grand jury: 1) the Agricultural
Credit Act; 2) the Texas ADR statute; and 3) the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
("ADRA"), which allows federal agencies to use ADR processes to resolve

3. Id.
4. d. at 489.
5. Id. at 490. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Government's argument that the
Moczygembas lacked standing to challenge the grand jury subpoena. The Moczygembas' claim of
privilege regarding the mediation records at issue provided standing as a third party to challenge the
grand jury subpoena. See In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1073-74 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 814 F.2d 61,66 (lst Cir. 1987).
6. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d at 489; see Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, 7. U.S.C. §
5102 (1998).
7. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d at 489.
8. Id. The Secretary of Agriculture certifies the state program subject to this condition. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 154.073(a)).
I1.Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.073(d)).
12. Id. at 490.
13. Id.
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disputes.' 4 On remand, the magistrate judge entered an order quashing the subpoena
as to documents involving the Moczygembas' mediation proceedings at TAM. 5 The
Government
subsequently appealed the District Court's decision to the Fifth
16
Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 7 The court found that the although
mediation proceedings are "confidential," they do not rise to the level of "privileged"
communication.
The court held information revealed in mediation proceedings
is not precluded from being disclosed to a grand jury when Congress has deemed the
proceedings to be "confidential," but not "privileged."' 9

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Mediation Process
The mediation process uses a third-party neutral to oversee and facilitate
negotiations between disputing parties.20 Mediation proceedings are non-binding,
with the third-party neutral having no authority to force a solution on the parties.2'
In fact, the inability to impose a solution upon the parties is exactly what makes
mediation a favorable and increasingly popular alternative to adjudicatory
processes. 22 Mediation is an informal process where legal rules of procedure and
evidence are inapplicable." The process excludes witness testimony and is
sometimes conducted without counsel for the respective parties.2 4 These
arrangements allow mediation to be a faster, less stressful, and less expensive
alternative to traditional legal proceedings.2" The mediation proceedings are

14. Id. at 491; see Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, 7 U.S.C. § 5101(c)(3)(d) ("mediation sessions
shall be confidential"); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.073(a) ("a communication ...
made...
in an alternative dispute resolution procedure ... is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may
not be used as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding");
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) ("a neutral ... shall not voluntarily disclose or
through discovery or compulsory process be required to disclose.., any communication provided in
confidence").
15. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d at 490.
16. Id. The Court ruled that the decision was a final judgment and, therefore, appealable. Id.
(citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena for Attorney Representing Criminal Defendant Reyes-Requena,
913 F.2d 1118, 1122 (5th Cir. 1990)).
17. Id.at 493.
18. Id.at 492 (citing Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that ADR records were confidential but not privileged)).
19. Id. at 493
20. Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition From Theory to Implementation:
Designing A Mediation PrivilegeStandardTo ProtectMediation Participants,The Process And The
PublicInterest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1,5 (1995).
21. d.at6.
22. See Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation US.A., 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 1031, 1033-82 (1996) (a
national survey on mediation, conducted by contacting each state's bar association, reports to what
extent the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico use mediation to resolve disputes).
23. Kirtley, supra note 20, at 8.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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undertaken with the goal that the disputing parties will reach a mutually agreed upon
settlement that satisfies the needs of all interested parties.26 The informal nature of
mediation also allows the parties to expand the pie by implementing non-traditional
legal remedies." Besides the ability to allocate monetary resources, mediation
settlements can incorporate remedies as diverse as the offering of employment, the
writing of apologies, the exchanging of labor, and unconventional payment options.'
By holding itself out as an informal process, mediation invites openness. 29 The
neutral mediator helps foster this openness through the use of joint sessions and
caucuses where a rapport and understanding of underlying interests is built.3 ° The
mediator uses "techniques designed to circumvent strategic, cognitive, and other
barriers that often impede negotiations."'" Mediation is designed to encourage the
parties to discuss relevant issues, facts, interests, and emotions.3 2 Promoting frank
and honest discourse between the parties and the mediator allows for the broader
solutions mentioned above.33 The mediator uses the blanket promise of
confidentiality to promote free-flowing exchange.34 As a result, parties "reveal
personal and business secrets,
share deep-seated feelings about others, and make
35
'
admissions of fact and law.
B. Confidentiality Versus Mediation Privilege
The promise that communications will remain confidential is crucial to the
success of mediation proceedings.36 The Second Circuit found that a confidentiality
guarantee allows parties to "discuss matters in an uninhibited fashion" and that if the
communication produced during mediation sessions is not protected, then "[parties]
of necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious, tight lipped,
non committal manner more suitable to poker players .. . This atmosphere, if
allowed to exist, would surely destroy the effectiveness of [the] program."37 The
mediator must ensure that statements remain confidential, because it allows the
parties to see the mediator as completely neutral, and encourages bold disclosures
that enable creative, satisfying solutions which are otherwise strangled in
adjudicative proceedings that usually operate without confidence.3 s Confidentiality
helps erase any suspicion that the mediator will disclose information gathered during

26. Id. at 5.
27. Pamela A. Kentra, HearNo Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict For
Attorney-Mediators Between The Duty To Maintain Mediation ConfidentialityAnd The Duty To
Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 720-21 (1997).
28. Id. at 721 n.16.
29. Kirtley, supra note 20, at 9.
30. Id.
31. Michael A. Perino, DraftingMediation Privileges:Lessons From The Civil Justice Reform
Act, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 6 (1995).
32. Kirtley, supra note 20, at 9.
33. Id. see text accompanying note 28.
34. Kirtley, supra note 20, at 9.
35. Id.
36. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation - A PreferredMethod of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L.
REv. S5, $29 (1989).
37. Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F. 2d. 928, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1979).
38. Feinberg, supra note 36, at S29.
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the proceedings in subsequent legal matters. 9 Confidentiality, however, does not
translate into a protective mediation privilege.
Various practices and theories have been used to protect the confidentiality of
mediation, including: (1) private contracts; (2) common law protections; (3) state
statutes; and (4) evidentiary rules of privilege.40 Private contracts are dangerous
because a party may breach the contract, forcing the harmed party to bring suit after
confidence has been compromised. 4' The contracts are not binding on third-parties
and, therefore, communications could be used as evidence.42 The use of the
"relevancy rule" is the common law basis.43 "The relevancy rule allows the court to
exclude evidence of a proposed compromise under the assumption that this
information is not reliable evidence of the truth of the offeror's claim." This rule,
however, allows evidence of conduct and independent statements of fact made by
the parties to be admitted into evidence.43
State statutes provide another basis for confidentiality.46 These statutes vary in
the amount of protection offered, 47 and some have clauses that defer to other statutes
if its provision conflicts with another statute's provision. 48 The statutes that are the
most effective in providing protection from the disclosure of oral and written
mediation communications use a three phrase wording scheme to provide an ironclad
protective rule.49 The Texas ADR statute uses the three phase protection, holding
that a statement made in mediation "is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and
may not be used as evidence" to protect communication in mediation proceedings. °
Sherman comments that "this provision protects communication from disclosure to
any source, such as a court, a prosecutor, [or] an administrative agency ....[T]he
drafters obviously wanted to emphasize that records are confidential and that
participants may not be required to testify or be subject to process. [Section51
154.073(a)] provides an explicit privilege against required disclosure in any form."'
The final theory used for protecting confidentiality in mediation proceedings,
and the theory emphasized in this note, is the evidentiary rule of privilege. There are
two major ways to create an evidentiary privilege. The Federal Rules of Evidence

39. Id.
40. Kentra, supra note 27, at 727 (1997).
41. Id. at 731.
42. Id.
43. Id.at 732.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 733.
47. Id. Categories of protection range from: blanket protection; waiver statutes; statutes
safeguarding protected groups; confidentiality statutes that promote the court's and society's need for
evidence; public protection confidentiality exception statutes; exceptions related to court
administration needs; governmental and subject-matter-specific confidentiality exceptions; and
research and record-keeping exceptions. Id.
48. In re Grand JurySubpoena, 148 F.3d at 491.
49. Edward. S. Sherman, ConfidentialityIn ADR Proceedings:Policy Issues Arising From The
Texas Experience, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 541, 547 (1997).
50. Id.(citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 154.073 (1997)).
51. Id.
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allow the courts to create a common-law privilege, 52 or the legislature can use its
law-making ability to enact privileges."
When considering whether or not to create a common-law privilege, the court
uses the four-part Wigmore balancing test.' The elements of the four-part test
developed by Dean John Henry Wigmore are:
(1) the communications must originate in confidence that they will not be disclosed;
(2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relations between the parties; (3) the relation must be one which,
in the opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) the injury
that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." To
create a common-law privilege, a court uses this four-part test to weigh the public
interest to be promoted by protecting the information against the need for probative
evidence and the fundamental principle of the public's right to every person's
evidence.56
The federal courts have been unwilling to create a universal privilege to govern
the mediation process.5 7 "Privileges are based on the idea that certain societal values
are more important than the search for truth... [therefore] Judge-made privileges
have fallen into disfavor."" The Ninth Circuit, however, did recognize a mediator
privilege in Joseph Macaluso, believing a mediation privilege was necessary to
protect the appearance of a mediator's neutrality, which the court said was essential
to the success of the mediation process. 59 Congress, in the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, directed all ninety-four districts to examine the benefits of ADR processes
in an effort to decrease the costs and delays incurred in civil litigation, but it did not
create a mediation privilege. 60
The states have been more supportive of a mediation privilege, with at least
forty-one states having some type of mediation privilege created by state statutes."'
The Texas ADR Statute has been considered one of the most comprehensive in
providing the protection of confidentiality of written and oral communications made
during the mediation process.62 The state of Washington and other state statutes
have extended the mediation privilege to preclude communications from criminal
proceedings.63 These statutes use phrases like "civil and criminal," "any
proceeding," "any subsequent legal proceeding," or "judicial or administrative

52. Kentra, supra note 27, at728; see FED. R. EvID. 501.
53. Kentra, supra note 27, at 728.
54. Perino, supra note 31, at 11 n.60.
55. Id.
56. Smith v. Smith, 154 F.D.R. 661, 673 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40,47,51 (1980)).
57. Perino, supra note 31, at 10-11 n.57. But see NLRB v.Joseph Macaluso, Inc.,
618 F.2d 51
(9th Cir. 1980); Maine Cent. R.R. Co. v.Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Emps., 117 F.R.D. 485 (D.
Me. 1987) (recognizing a federal mediation privilege). See, e.g., Smith v.Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661
(N.D.Tex. 1994) (refusing to recognize a federal mediation privilege)).
58. Smith, 154 F.R.D. at 673 (citing In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1981)).
59. Perino, supra note 31, at 10-11.
60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. at 1.
62. Smith, 154 F.R.D., at666-67.
63. Kirtley, supra note 20,at29.
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proceeding," to extend the privilege to criminal proceedings.6 State statues that
apply to both civil and criminal cases "are consistent with existing privilege law and
will undoubtedly be interpreted to extend to such actions." 6 Extending the privilege
to protect communications that might lead to evidence of criminal activity is not
likely to be embraced by federal courts, which have so far lacked the enthusiasm to
create a general mediation privilege in the less controversial arena of civil
proceedings.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's statutory
interpretation de novo.' The court began by noting that the Texas ADR statute and
the ADRA had no application to the case, because the Agricultural Credit Act does
not indicate that the meaning of "confidential" should be determined by outside
sources. 67 The court compared the ADRA to the Agricultural Credit Act and found
that the ADRA used differing language from that of the Agricultural Credit Act to
establish a privilege." In the instant decision, the court reasoned that the use of the
word "confidential" in the Agricultural Credit Act could not be construed to create
a mediation privilege based on legislative intent.69 The court stated that Congress
recognized that confidentiality is needed in mediation proceedings in order to
promote the free flow of information between the parties, however, Congress did not
clearly express a desire to make these communications privileged.70 The court noted
that Congress "obviously" desired to protect the communications of mediation
proceedings to some extent by using the word "confidential. 71 However, it noted
that privileges are created only with clear legislative intent.72 The court cited Nguyen
for the proposition that
Da Yen v. Kissinger, and State v. Thompson,
"confidentiality" does not mean "privileged. '73
The court, relying on United State v. Nixon, was unwilling to establish a
privilege claiming that privileges are not created lightly. " The Court stated that it
did not believe that the Moczygembas' confidential mediation proceedings were in
grave danger of being compromised by disclosure to the grand jury alone, because

64. Id. at 28.
65. Id.
66. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d at 491.
67. Id. at 491-92. This was a departure from the district courts analysis. The district court used
these two statutes to determine that a federal mediation privilege existed when they looked to these
statues to determine the meaning of "confidential" under the Agricultural Credit Act § 5101 (c)(3)(D).
Id.
68. Id. The ADRA § 574(a) provides that a mediator "shall not voluntarily disclose or through
discovery or compulsory process be required to disclose any information concerning any dispute
resolution communication or any communication provided in confidence" to the mediator. Id.
69. Id. at 492.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975); State v.
Thompson, 338 P.2d 319, 322 (1959)).
74. Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure under rule 6(e) provide for a general rule
of secrecy." The Court stated that the secretive nature of grand jury proceedings do
not severely compromise the confidentiality of mediation proceedings. 6 However,
it was noted in the decision that if the grand jury did find probable cause of criminal
wrongdoing the communications could become public." This potential disclosure
by the grand jury process did not concern the court because the language used in the
Agricultural Credit Act should not act as a "shield" for criminal wrongdoing arising
from a mediation process. 78 The Court said that the public's interest in the
administration of criminal justice outweighs the need to uphold the integrity of
dispute resolution proceedings even if this reduces a future party's confidence that
their communications will remain confidential. 79 The court stated that even the
ADRA provides for disclosure of mediation proceedings when the disclosure is
needed to establish a violation of law. 0 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, held that the
documents and communications generated during mediation proceedings are not
protected from disclosure by a privilege when Congress only uses the term
"confidential" in a statute applicable to ADR proceedings. 8

V. COMMENT
As evidenced by the instant case, the creation of a mediation privilege, although
popular with the states, is not likely to be established by the federal judiciary anytime
soon. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the court to declare new
privileges, however, the Rule envisions that these new privileges will be
incrementally developed by the court."2 The court did not go through the four-part
Wigmore balancing test to see if the communications should be protected by a
privilege. However, if the Wigmore test had been applied by the Fifth Circuit it is
likely that a mediation privilege would conflict with the fourth part of this test 83
The first part of the test appears to be satisfied. In the present case the parties
were presumably operating under the assumption that the communication would
remain confidential as warranted under the Texas ADR Statute that governed the
farm debt mediation program used in Texas. The second part is also satisfied. It is
widely recognized that mediation's success directly correlates to the free-flow of

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Smith, 154 F.R.D. at 673 (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
83. Perino, supra note 31, at II n.60. The four-parts of the Wigmore balancing test are: (1) the
communications must originate in confidence that they will not be disclosed; (2) this element of
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the
parties; (3) the relation must be one which, in the opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously
fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 8 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE AT TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (rev. ed. 1961).
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information between the parties. As discussed earlier, this exchange is prompted by
the declared and perceived neutrality of the third-party neutral. If communications
are not protected then the process could fail, as parties would be more reluctant to
disclose damaging information to the opponent and the neutral mediator.8 ' The third
part is also satisfied, as ADR processes have undoubtedly graduated from passing
fad to a legitimate way of dealing with disputes in a number of areas.8 5 With fortyone states adopting a mediation privilege, 6 a few federal courts recognizing the need
for a mediation privilege, 7 and the bulk of scholarly authority supporting the use of
such a privilege,8" it appears that the a privilege for mediation communications is
"sedulously fostered" by the opinion of the community.89
As for the fourth part, the Fifth Circuit found that it was not satisfied. The Fifth
Circuit was concerned about the possibility of a privilege denying the grand jury
information that, if precluded from disclosure, would shield the wrongdoing of
participants, including the parties, mediators, and directors of mediation programs.
The court stated that "any interest the Moczygembas have in confidentiality of their
mediation sessions will have to give way to the public interest in the administration
of criminal justice."' Most of the authority supporting the recognition of a federal
mediation privilege is directed toward civil matters. However, a mediation privilege
that ends up protecting the disclosure of criminal wrongdoing in mediation
proceedings should not be troublesome. 9' It is argued that parties would only tell of
criminal wrongdoing during ADR proceedings if they thought it was protected from
disclosure. 92 Thus parties that might disclose incriminating information in order to
facilitate a settlement during a mediation proceeding, would be unlikely to disclose
this information and expose themselves to criminal prosecution. Therefore, a
chilling effect might result in mediation discussions which inhibits the effectiveness
of the mediation process to resolve disputes.
In the instant case, the grand jury subpoena sought the communications, not for
the criminal prosecution of the parties, but to further establish the criminal
wrongdoing suspected of TAM, the mediation program, during a USDA audit of
TAM. Some state statutes would probably protect this communication even under
the present situation if the issue arose in a state matter, because of the broad
protection these statutes create.93 By receiving this particular case on appeal, the
Fifth Circuit was able to delay a decision on whether to recognize a federal
mediation privilege in civil proceedings. However, the Fifth Circuit's referral to
United States v. Nixon, 94 which states that evidentiary privileges are not created
lightly when left to the judiciary, because of the public's right to every person's

84. Kirtley, supra note 20, at 16, n.99 (listing scholarly authority supporting the theory that
confidentiality is the primary factor in the success of mediation).
85. Kentra, supra note 27, at 719.
86. Perino, supra note 31, at I
87. Id. at 10 n.57.
88. Kirtley, supra note 20, at 16 n.99, 17 n.105.
89. Id.at 16, 17.
90. In re GrandJury Subpoena, 148 F.3d at 493.
91. Kirtley, supra note 20, at 45.
92. Id. at 29.
93. TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(a) (Supp. 1997).
94. 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
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evidence, suggests that the Fifth Circuit would not establish a mediation privilege for
civil disputes. This fact, coupled with the statement of the court that the term
"confidential" is not construed to mean "privileged" would seem to support the
theory that the Fifth Circuit has a distaste for a mediation privilege in any context.
Until the Supreme Court has the chance to hear the issue or Congress passes a law
granting a mediation privilege, this decision leaves the mediation processes in the
Fifth Circuit unprotected when litigated under the jurisdiction of federal courts.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit's decision under the facts in the present case was probably
what a majority of scholars, courts, and state legislatures would support. It would
be difficult for a court to grant a mediation privilege in the face of suspected criminal
wrongdoing, especially since the grand jury hearing was investigating the mediation
program and not the parties themselves. The Fifth Circuit has not even granted a
mediation privilege to parties in civil disputes. Since the courts are supposed to
move slowly when creating new privileges, it would be unlikely for a court to
establish the privilege in a criminal proceeding before doing so in a civil context.
The creation of a federal mediation privilege would practically assure the parties that
their discourse in mediation proceedings would remain protected from discovery.
Some scholars would argue that a mediation privilege is needed, while others would
abhor it. The present system leaves much to be desired; varying state statutes and
differing opinions in circuit and district courts leave present and future participants
of mediation proceedings wondering if their communications will be protected from
opponents and outsiders.
JOSHUA

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1999/iss1/7

J. ENGELBART

10

